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STUDENT SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK BASED 
ON THE R OLE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN D EMOCRATIC 
EDUCATION 
Curtis G. Bentley' 
"I t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 
-Justice Fortas2 
"I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my 
part to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, 
parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the 
American public school system to public school students." 
- Justice Black3 
I. I NTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker u. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,4 the fact that 
public school students retain First Amendment speech rights 
while in school has become generally-although not 
universally-accepted. Nevertheless, the problem of how to 
balance concern for student expression with the teaching and 
discipline requirements of public schools remains a thorny 
problem for which the Supreme Court has been unable to 
devise a comprehensive and coherent answer. Notwithstanding 
the continued assertion of the few who argue that the First 
Amendment provides no protection for student speech in public 
schools,5 the difficult question is no longer whether public 
1. J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2008. 
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
3. ld. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting). 
4. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
5. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J .. 
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school6 students have First Amendment free speech rights 
while in school, but what is the nature and extent of the rights 
that accompany them past the schoolhouse gate? 
Even though nearly forty years have passed since the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Tinker, the constitutional 
standard announced in that case remains the focus of the 
spirited debate over student free speech rights in public 
schools.7 The debate has simply been magnified by the Court's 
three subsequent public school student free speech cases, which 
have all upheld school limitations on student expression while 
ostensibly leaving the Tinker standard intact. The debate over 
what Tinker actually says, or should say, was reignited in 
2007, when the Court issued its decision in Morse v. Frederick, 
the so-called ''bong hits for Jesus" case. After Morse, it is clear 
that Tinker's holding was not as broad as many have supposed. 
Many had assumed, and continued to assume until Morse, 
that the rule laid down in Tinker established a presumption in 
favor of student speech that could only be overcome if the 
school could show that the speech disrupted the educational 
process.8 Under such a rule, schools could only prohibit speech 
if they could show that the speech interfered with the other 
students' ability to learn whatever was being taught at the 
time.9 And, indeed, this interpretation of the holding is 
concurring). While Justice Thomas concurred in the Court's finding that the school's 
punishment for the speech at issue in Morse was constitutional, he argued that the 
original understanding of the First Amendment provided no protection for student 
speech. 
6. The term "public schools" is used throughout t his article to refer to both 
primary (elementary) schools and secondary (high) schools. Colleges and universities 
are referred to as "institutions of higher education."' 
7. See, e.g .. Heather K. Lloyd, Comment, Injustice in our Schools: Students' Free 
Speech Rights are not Being Vigilantly Protected, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265 (2001); 
Jonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different 
Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586 (2002); Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and 
Viewpoint Discrimination in Public Schools, 32 P EPP. L. REV. 637 (2005); J ennifer L. 
Specht, Note, Younger Students, Different Rights? Examining the Standard for 
Student-Tnitiated RP.ligious Free Speech in Elementary School.~. 91 CORNELL L. REv. 
1313 (2006). 
8. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student 
Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. R~v. 379, 391 n.47 (1995) (setting out the 
broad interpretation of 1'inker a nd collecting cases where courts applied it prior to 
Hazelwood). 
9. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bethel Sch. Dist. u. Fraser, 755 F.2d 1356, (9th 
Cir. 1985), reu'd, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), provides a good example of the application of the 
broad interpretation of 1'inker. The Ninth Circuit found the disciplinary actions of the 
school district unconstitutional, noting that the student speech at issue did not 
materially disrupt the educationa l process and rejecting the school district's other 
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consistent with the result in Tinker, since the students' mere 
wearing of black armbands caused no significant disturbance in 
the classroom. 10 This reading of the Court's opinion will be 
referred to through the balance of this article as the broad 
interpretation of Tinker. 
Although the broad interpretation of Tinker is consistent 
with its result, it is not mandated by the language used by the 
Court. I argue that, not only was the broad interpretation not 
mandated by the Tinker decision, it is an incorrect application 
of the First Amendment and inconsistent with the Court's 
other First Amendment jurisprudence. The broad 
interpretation, ignoring important differences in context and 
method, essentially applies the same presumption in favor of 
speech by children in public schools that exists for adults in a 
higher education setting. 11 By doing so, the broad 
interpretation ignores both the differences in context between 
public school and higher education as well as the different 
ways in which each type of institution serves the democratic 
values that First Amendment protection exists to promote. 
The Court's subsequent public school student free speech 
decisions in Bethel School District v. Fraser, 12 Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 13 and especially Morse, indicate 
that the broad interpretation was not adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Tinker. The Court's holdings in these cases are 
welcome developments. Yet, despite its rejection of the broad 
interpretation of Tinker in Morse, the Supreme Court offered 
no comprehensive approach to public school student free speech 
rights in its place. In this article, I outline a comprehensive 
approach that I believe is most consistent with both the 
purpose of the First Amendment, as well as the Court's 
conception of the First Amendment as an essential support to 
constitutional democracy rather than an individual self-
expressive right. 
Specifically, I contend that, although the First Amendment 
argument that its interest in maintaining civility in the school environment justified 
its actions. /d. at 1359-64. 
10. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) 
(''[Tjhe record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred."). 
ll. See discussion infra Part TV. 
12. 478 u.s. 675 (1986). 
] 3. 484 u.s. 260 (1988). 
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protects student expression in public schools, it does so only for 
expression that a Court can find to be reasonably necessary to 
the public school's role in democratic education.14 Drawing on 
the work of Professor Amy Gutmann, 15 I argue that the basic 
content of such an education, at least in public schools, is the 
inculcation in young students of the essential democratic 
values of nonrepression and nondiscrimination. I assert that 
First Amendment protection for student speech in public 
schools gives way against the regulatory actions of public 
school officials unless it cannot reasonably be said that the 
school's actions further the aims of democratic education. 16 
Part II of this article provides a brief discussion of each of 
the Court's four primary public school student free speech 
cases. 17 Next, Part III advances the argument that the purpose 
of the First Amendment is utilitarian; that it exists to enable 
democratic self-government rather than conferring a natural 
right to self-realization through expression. Part III also shows 
how the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has 
largely proceeded consistently with this view, and therefore 
that an instrumental approach to student speech in public 
schools would be more consistent with the Court's broader First 
Amendment jurisprudence than its current ad hoc, post-Tinker 
framework. Building on this utilitarian view of free speech 
protection, Part N briefly discusses both the nature of 
democratic education and the role of different educational 
institutions in that process. While acknowledging that both 
public schools and institutions of higher education have 
important roles to play in the process of democratic education, 
those roles will be differentiated, and how democratic 
principles and skills are taught differently in each context will 
be discussed. Part V applies the principles discussed in Parts 
14. The term "democratic education•· is used in this article to refer to the school's 
responsibility for instilling democratic values a nd t he instruction of democratic s kills 
required for effective individual participation in the enterprise of self-government. 
15. I adopt Professor Gutmann's concept of democratic education as set out in her 
important book titled by the same name. Amy Gutmann, Demot:ratic Education 
(Princeton University Press) (1987); see also infra Part IV. 
16. In this ar ticle, I do not address the possible effects that the hybrid rights 
doctrine mentioned by ,Justice Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) might have on student speech that implicates religion. 
17. Although some of the controversial student speech occuning in public schools 
has the potential to implicate other First Amendment values- especially freedom of 
religion-and therefore might potentially be protected at a greater level under the 
hybrid rights doctrine, the hybrid rights doctrine is outs ide the scope of this article. 
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III and IV, and sets out the broad outline of a comprehensive 
theory of First Amendment protection of student speech in the 
public school context. Finally, Part VI contains a brief 
conclusion. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S P UBLIC SCHOOL FREE SPEECH 
CASES: FROM TINKER TO MORSE 
Prior to 1969, the Supreme Court had never held that 
public school students possessed free speech rights while in 
public school. 18 The long-time assumption was that, under the 
doctrine of in loco parentis, 19 students possessed no more right 
to free speech in school than they did at home. Essentially, 
schools were viewed as the agents of parents in teaching and 
disciplining students, and courts granted them a similar level 
of deference.2° From the in loco parentis perspective, public 
schools, even though they were public, were locally controlled 
and looked at more as an extension of the home than as an 
extension of the state.21 According to this view, the First 
Amendment was not implicated in student speech at all, since 
there was no state action. 
As states began to assert more control over the public 
18. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2633 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting that "Tinker effected a sea of change in students' speech rights, extending them 
well beyond traditional bounds.'"); see also Fiona Ruthven, Note, Is the True Threat the 
Student or the School Board? Punishing Threatening Student Expression, 88 IOWA L. 
RF.v. 931, 936 (2003) (noting that the Court had not recognized student free speech 
rights until Tinker) . 
19. Translated from Latin, in loco parentis means "in the place of a parent." 
Black's Law Dictionary 803 (8th Ed., 2004). For an examination of the traditional view 
of puhlic schools as extensions of parental authority rather than traditionally public 
institutions. see Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631- 42 (Thomas, J. , concurring) (discussing 
doctrine of in loco parentis in American educational history); Bruce C. Hafen, 
Developing Student Expre.~sion Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as 
Mediating Structures. 48 OHIO ST. L..J. 663 (1987) (discussing the traditional view of 
public school as a "natural extension of family life and parental interests" and that 
schools were "recipients of delegated parental authority"); DAVID J. BLACKF.R, 
D~MOCHATIC EDUCATION STRETCHED THIN: HOW COMPLEXITY CHALLENGES A LIBERAL 
I DEAL 22 (State University of New York Press) (2007). 
20. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("(A parent] may also 
delegate part of his parental authority. during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of 
his chi ld: who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the pawer of the parent 
committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to 
answer the purposes for which he is employed" (quoting l William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 441 (1765) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
21. See Hafen, supra note 18, at 671-74. 
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schools, especially by employing the schools as tools to achieve 
racial integration and by standardizing curricula, many began 
to question the local, in loco parentis, view of public schools.22 
It became increasingly clear that the public school system was 
an arm of the state and that, despite a tradition of local control, 
they were very much a part of the institutional structure that 
was being questioned on university campuses and elsewhere 
during the era.23 It is almost inconceivable that these changing 
views of the school system did not contribute to the Supreme 
Court's recognition of student speech rights in Tinker. 
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District 
Tinker involved a school's response to the decision of three 
students to wear black armbands, while at school during the 
holiday season, as a protest against American involvement in 
Vietnam. Before the students began their silent protest, the 
Des Moines school district was advised of their plans and 
announced that any student wearing the armbands to school 
would be suspended until they were willing to return to school 
without the armbands. The three students nonetheless wore 
the armbands to school and were accordingly suspended until 
their protest ended following New Years Day.24 
In its opinion, the Court claimed that it had recognized, for 
almost fifty years prior to Tinker, the First Amendment rights 
of both teachers and students.25 It also noted, however, that it 
had repeatedly recognized and upheld the "comprehensive 
authority" given to public school officials to "prescribe and 
control conduct."26 After setting out these two competing 
recognitions, the Court adopted a balancing approach that the 
Fifth Circuit had earlier employed in the case: 
A studentO . . . may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does 
so without "materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the 
22. See id. at 674 (noting that the use of public schools as "sta te agents i n the 
desegregation of society" beginning with Brown u. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), caused people to begin seeing public schools as "arms of the federal 
government" rather than local agents). 
23. ld . at 677- 80; see also Bruce C. Hafen , Hazelwood School District and the 
Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 D UKE L.J. 685, 701-04 (1988). 
24. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
25. I d. at 506. 
26. Id. at 507. 
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requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school" and without colliding with the rights of others. But 
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any 
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior- materially disrupts class work or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of 
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech.27 
7 
Focusing on the silent nature of the protest, the Court held 
that the school district's actions violated the students' rights to 
free speech. Although it recognized that even a silent protest 
had the potential to ignite disruptive argument over an issue, 
the Court did not feel that the district had demonstrated that 
such a disruption was likely, and saw the district's actions as 
primarily motivated by "an urgent wish to avoid the 
controversy which might result from the expression, even by 
the silent symbol of armbands, of opposition to this Nation's 
part in the conflagration in Vietnam."28 
Many viewed the language used by the Tinker court as 
establishing a broad presumption in favor of student speech 
that was only overcome when the speech was disruptive to the 
teaching going on in the classroom.29 Although this is perhaps 
the most natural reading of the case's language, Tinker could 
be read more narrowly as well, especially given some of the 
facts of the case. Because Tinker involved speech that 
advocated a specific viewpoint on a current and salient political 
issue, it involved political speech-the type of speech that the 
Court has always viewed as the central reason for the First 
Amendment's existence.30 Additionally, since the armbands 
were clearly aimed at showing support for the anti-Vietnam 
War movement, the district's response smacked of viewpoint 
discrimination, a type of discrimination that the Court had 
recognized as extremely suspect in its other First Amendment 
jurisprudence.31 Finally, the two concurring and the dissenting 
27. I d. at 512- 13 (internal citations omitted, second alternation in original). 
28. Id. at 510. 
29. See Hafen, supra note 22, at 689 ("[T]he dominant assumption in most school 
speech cases has been that Tin.ller established a const itutional presumption against 
limitations on student expression- rebuttable only upon a showing of material (usually 
physical) disruption of schoolwork or clear invasions of the rights of others."). 
30. See, e.g., Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514 U.S. 334. 346 (1995). 
31. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 394 (I 993) (''The principle that has emerged from our cases is that the First 
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opinions in the case all express some level of discomfort with 
the broad language used by the Tinker court,32 suggesting that, 
despite the fact that the decision was 7-2, there was a much 
narrower consensus, if any, on the broad interpretation. 
The extent of Tinker's reach was left to subsequent Supreme 
Court cases to define. 
B. Bethel School District u. Fraser 
The Court waited almost fifteen years before it opined 
again on the extent of student free speech rights in public 
schools. When it did, it chose Bethel School District u. Fraser as 
the vehicle. In Fraser, a student was disciplined for a speech he 
gave advocating a particular candidate for student government 
at a high school assembly.33 While the content of the student's 
speech could not fairly be classified as obscene,34 the speech 
Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some 
viewpoints or ideas at t he expense of others.") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
32. Thus, even though the result in Tinker was 7- 2, absent the concurring and 
the dissenting votes, the majority opinion itself only received the unqual ified support of 
five J ustices. Both of the concurring opinions expressed reservations about the 
broadness of t he majority's holding. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514-15 (1969) (Stewart, J. , 
concurring) ("Although I agree with much of what is said in the Court's opinion, and 
with its judgment in th is case, I cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that. 
school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with 
those of adults."); !d. at 515 (White, J ., concurring) ("While I join the Court's opinion, 1 
deem it appropriate to note, first, that the Court continues to recognize a distinction 
between communicating by words and communicating by acts or conduct which 
sufficiently impinges on some valid state interest; and, second, that I do not subscribe 
to everything the Court of Appeals said about free speech in its opinion in Burnside u. 
Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966), a case relied upon by t.he Court in the matter 
now before us."); ld. at 525-26 (Black, J., dissenting) (''This case, therefore, wholly 
without constitutional reasons in my judgment, s ubjects all the public schools in the 
country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their 
brightest. students. I, for one, am not fully persuaded that school pupils arc wise 
enough, even with this Court's expert help from Washington, to run the 23,390 public 
school systems in our 50 States. I wish, therefore, wholly to disclai m a ny purpose on 
my part to hold that t he Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and 
elected school officials to surrendet· control of the American public school system to 
public school students."); !d. at 526 (Harlan, J ., dissenting) ("l am reluctant to believe 
that there is any disagreement between the majority and myself on the proposition 
that school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline 
and good order in their institutions. To translate t hat proposition into a workable 
constitutional rule, I would, in cases like this, cast upon those complaining the burden 
of showing that a paTticular school measure was motivated by other than legitimatl:! 
school concerns-for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point 
of view, while permitting expression of the domina nt opinion.''). 
33. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986). 
34. !d. at 687 (Brennan, J .. concurring) (reproducing the content of the speech 
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was essentially a sexual metaphor and caused substantial 
disturbance among the students present during the assembly.35 
Even though the speech caused a substantial disturbance, 
the Supreme Court declined the invitation to simply apply the 
Tinker rule to the facts in Fraser. Perhaps this was because the 
speech occurred in an assembly, where teachers were not 
explicitly teaching, rather than in the classroom. Instead, the 
Court distinguished Tinker and Fraser based on the sexual 
nature of the student's speech and its incompatibility with the 
values-teaching mission of public schools: 
We hold that petitioner School District acted entirely within 
its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser 
in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech .... 
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials 
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech 
such as respondent's would undermine the school's basic 
educational mission. A high school assembly or classroom is 
no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an 
unsuspecting audience of teenage students. Accordingly, it 
was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself 
to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd 
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the "fundamental values" 
of public school education.36 
Even though the Court officially rested its holding in Fraser 
on the "vulgar" nature of the student's speech, the opinion 
contained numerous statements by the Court regarding the 
appropriateness of deferring to educational authorities in 
matters relating to the educational mission of the schools, and 
even quoted with approval from Justice Black's dissenting 
opinion in Tinker.31 However, even though the general tenor of 
the Court's opinion in Fraser suggested the Court was 
distancing itself from the broad interpretation of Tinker, the 
two decisions were ostensibly distinguished by the content of 
the speech, and therefore the broad interpretation of Tinker 
and contending that it is no more obscene or offensive than much prime time television 
content). 
35. ld. at 678. 
:~6. ld. at 685- 86. 
37. !d. at 686 ("I wish therefore, ... to disclaim any purpose . .. to hold that the 
Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to 
surrender control of the American public school system to public school students.") 
(quoting Tinl~er, 393 U.S. at 526 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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was not foreclosed in cases where the speech at issue was not 
indecent or vulgar. 
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
The Supreme Court made a more substantial shift away 
from the broad interpretation of Tinker in its next student free 
speech case: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 38 
Hazelwood involved a school's censorship of two student-
written articles on student pregnancy and divorce for the 
school newspaper. The school principal censored the articles on 
the ground that they dealt with subjects that were 
inappropriate for public school children.39 
The Supreme Court upheld the censorship in Hazelwood, 
even though there was no credible argument that it was lewd 
or vulgar like the speech in Fraser, or that it was likely to 
cause a substantial disruption of the educational process under 
the Tinher standard. Instead, the Court employed an analytical 
tool that it had used in its adult free speech cases: public forum 
analysis. In other free speech cases, the Court has accorded 
more First Amendment protection to speech that occurs in a 
public forum.40 In Hazelwood, it examined whether or not a 
public school student newspaper could legitimately be 
considered a public forum. The Court stated that "school 
facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school 
authorities have by policy or by practice opened those facilities 
for indiscriminate use by the general public."41 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the student 
newspaper at issue in Hazelwood was not a public forum , and 
that the student articles were not entitled to the broad 
protection that its prior decisions had accorded to speech in 
public forums. In fact, the Court determined that some readers 
might assume that the school newspaper bore the imprimatur 
of the school. Thus, the speech at issue was not purely student 
expression, but a combination of student and government 
38. 484 u.s. 260 (1988). 
39. Id. at 262-64. 
40. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
800 (1985) ("[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of 
communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling 
governmental interest."). 
41. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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speech.42 Referring back to both Fraser and Tinker, the 
Hazelwood court stated that: 
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school 
to tolerate particular student speech-the question that we 
addressed in Tinker-is different from the question whether 
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to 
promote particular student speech .... The latter question 
concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school. 
... Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this 
second form of student expression .... Hence, a school may in 
its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of 
a school play "disassociate itself," ... from speech that would 
"substantially interfere with [its] work ... or impinge upon 
the rights of other students" ... In addition, a school must be 
able to take into account the emotional maturity of the 
intended audience in determining whether to disseminate 
student speech on potentially sensitive topics ... A school 
must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student 
speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug 
or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise 
inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized social 
order,". . . Otherwise, the schools would be unduly 
constrained from fulfilling their role as "a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional trainin~, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment."4 
Again, even though Hazelwood did not explicitly overrule 
Tinker, it further distanced itself from the Tinker court's 
commitment to broad student free speech rights in two ways: 
(1) it recognized that a substantial amount of speech that 
occurs in the public school system in which students are 
involved is not pure student speech like that at issue in Tinker; 
42. Some state legislatures have attempted to overrule this portion of the 
Supreme Court's holding by passing statutes that assign students all responsibility for 
the content of student newspapers. For a discussion of these laws, see Chris Sanders, 
Censorship 101: Anti·Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free Speech at Colleges 
and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2006). 
43. Hazelr.vood, 484 U.S. at 270-73 (citations omitted). 
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and (2) it focused again on the need of the schools to teach "the 
shared values of a civilized social order" and serve as the 
"principal instrument" in socializing children.44 While 
ostensibly leaving it intact, Hazelwood continued the Court's 
subtle redefinition and limitation of Tinker. While Hazelwood 
is most often cited for upholding a school's right to determine 
the content of speech that bears its imprimatur, it is also 
significant in its express r ecognition of the importance of public 
schools as a "principal instrument" of socialization and t he 
relevance of this mission in free speech cases. Hazelwood 
suggested that the Court's approach to the First Amendment in 
public schools, rather than being characterized as extending a 
broad presumption in favor of student speech , was more 
accurately characterized by a more limited holding that 
balances the uncertain speech rights of students against the 
strong interest of the state in using the public schools to 
socialize children according to fundamental societal values. 
D. Morse v. Frederick 
The Court waited near ly twenty years following Hazelwood 
to once again clarify the rule set out in Tinker, in light of its 
subsequent decisions in Fraser and Hazelwood. In Morse, the 
principal of a school suspended a student for refusing to take 
down a 14-foot banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" that he 
was displaying with other students during an off-campus, 
school-approved activity.45 The Ninth Circuit, applying the 
broad Tinker standard of substantial disruption, held that the 
principal's actions violated the student's First Amendment 
speech rights.46 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by the newly 
confirmed Chief Justice Roberts, r eversed the Ninth Circuit, 
primarily by clarifying the standard in Tinl<.er.47 Although he 
acknowledged the official distinctions the Court had made 
between Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, the Chief Justice 
disti1led the cases down to the basic principle "that the 
44. Jd. at 272 (citation omitted). 
45. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). 
46. !d. 
47. The way the Court reinterpreted Tinl~er was by rejecting the broad 
interpretation of the case, which viewed the "substantial disruption" standard as the 
only standard the government could use to justify personal (i .e. not school-sponsored) 
speech in public schools. See id. at 2627. 
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constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings."48 The Chief Justice viewed the Court's public school 
student free speech decisions subsequent to Tinher as making 
clear that the broad interpretation of Tinher did not provide 
the only means for restricting student speech.49 Instead, the 
Court reasoned that, independent of any particular disruption 
in the educational process, "[t]he special characteristics of the 
school environment . . . and the governmental interest in 
stopping student drug abuse" justified the principal's actions in 
Morse. 5° 
Morse is a significant decision on at least two different 
levels. First, it provides a general glimpse into how the new 
Roberts Court is likely to evaluate First Amendment issues. 
Second, and more relevant to this article, it is significant 
because it contains an explicit rejection of the broad 
interpretation of Tinker.51 Morse makes clear that, while 
Tinher is still good law insofar as it holds that student speech 
constituting a substantial disruption to the educational process 
(i.e. the classroom learning environment) is without First 
Amendment protection, it does not provide the only valid 
justification for the restriction of speechY Since the broad 
interpretation of Tinher viewed the "substantial disruption" 
standard as the sole justification for restricting student 
speech, 53 Morse foreclosed that interpretation once and for all. 
Even though the Morse court rejected the broad 
interpretation of Tinker, it declined to set out another 
comprehensive framework for analyzing public school student 
free speech claims. Instead, it simply created a rule for another 
narrow class of cases: those in which student speech can be 
reasonably interpreted as advocating the use of illegal drugs. 54 
48. ld. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
49. Id. at 2627. 
50. Td. at 2629 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
51. See supra note 46. 
52. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627. 
53. See supra notes 49- 50 and accompanying text. 
54. The speech at issue in Morse-the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner- provided 
the Supreme Court with a golden opportunity to embrace the hybrid rights doctrine. 
The inclusion of the word "J esus" in the banner opened the door for a claim that the 
speech should be accorded greater protection because it had a religious component. The 
viability of this argument was probably damaged by t he plaintiffs assertion that the 
speech was meaningless, nevertheless. the religious overtones provided an opportunity 
for the Court to embrace the hybrid rights doctrine, which it declined to do. 
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Essentially, what remains after Morse, Hazelwood, and Fraser 
is a series of ad hoc rules applicable to specific situations, with 
Tinker remaining as the analytical backdrop that has been 
largely ignored by the Court in the forty years since the 
decision was issued. In other words, the Court's public school 
speech trilogy since Tinl?-er has abandoned any pretenses of a 
comprehensive theory of how the First Amendment applies in 
public schools. I argue for a different approach- one that 
provides a coherent framework through which to evaluate the 
free speech rights of students in public schools. I argue that 
the Court should give substantial deference to public school 
decisions to regulate speech when the decision is necessary to 
accomplish what I contend is the principal First Amendment 
purpose of public schools: educating new generations of citizens 
prepared to engage in the democratic processes of self-
government. 
The following sections set out the justifications for this 
approach, as well as the reasons why it is compatible with the 
Court's general approach to the First Amendment. I begin with 
a brief discussion of the Court's conception of the First 
Amendment, move to a discussion of the role of the public 
schools in democratic education, and finish by setting out the 
contours of a public school student free speech rule consistent 
with these r ealities. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH TO THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Over the last thirty years there has been a substantial 
amount of debate over the purpose of the First Amendment. 
Although the debate is nuanced and complex, it is ultimately, 
when distilled to its essentials, one between those who believe 
that the First Amendment constitutionalizes a natural right to 
self-expression (the "self-realization view")55 and those who 
believe that it exists solely as a societal safeguard necessary to 
ensure effective democratic government (the "instrumental 
view"). 56 Courts' opinions on this question have obvious 
implications for all types of First Amendment analysis. A court 
55. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 
(1982). 
56. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971). 
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sympathetic to the self-realization view of the First 
Amendment sees the right of free speech to be a nat ural right 
accorded to all individuals and, all other things being equal, 
will be more likely to find the speech protected in all situations. 
While the self-realization view does not necessarily mean that 
expression receives absolute protection simply because it has 
been expressed,57 it gives analytical weight to the act of 
expression that is discounted hy those with an instrumental 
perspective. Conversely, a court that subscribes to the 
instrumental view will find speech protected only when, 
considering the context in which the speech occurs, protecting 
that speech furthers important societal values, especially 
democratic self-government. 58 
Consistent with the opinions of Professor Meiklejohn59 and 
Judge Bork,6° among others, I believe that the instrumentalist 
approach61 reflects both the wisest approach to the protection 
of the freedom of speech, and the view of the purpose of the 
First Amendment most consistent with the structure of 
American government set out by the Constitution. Although a 
comprehensive examination of the pros and cons of the 
different approaches to the First Amendment is beyond the 
scope of this article, the following paragraphs provide a limited 
discussion as to the implications of each approach, its 
consistency with current First Amendment doctrine, and 
justifications for adopting the instrumental view. 
A. The Self-Realization View 
Although the "self-realization" view is instrumental in the 
sense that it values speech because of its contribution to an 
57. See, e.g., Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 Harv. 
C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 443, 502 (1998) (noting that the self-realization view does not "mean 
that speech should win in each litigated case'" but simply "proposes that First 
Amendment analysis attend more self-consciously to the speaker's development 
through expression" in addition to "the benefits of the challenged speech for citizen-
listeners and the engines of democracy"). 
58. See, e.g., .Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2353, 2366-67 (2000) ("[C]ourts applying democratic 
theory have been clear that the First Amendment protects only speech pertinent to 
self-determination."). 
59. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF· 
GOVERNMENT (Harper & Brothers) (1948). 
60. See Bork, supra note 55. 
. 61. For an instance where the Supreme Court has articulated this approach, see 
mfra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
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individual's understanding and creation of their person and 
character, it is non-instrumental in practical effect. Because no 
outsider can determine what speech contributes to another's 
self-realization and what speech does not, the observer is forced 
into one of two situations: (1) either assume that all speech is 
self-expressive; or (2) take the speaker at his word when he 
claims that the speech has self-expressive value.62 If all self-
realizing speech is protected, taking the first position would 
result in no prohibitions of speech. The second approach would 
yield similar results, because upon any challenge, a speaker 
could simply assert the self-expressive value of his speech and 
have it protected. While less strict (and more realistic) 
applications of the self-realization view recognize situations 
where other values would trump self-realization, even such 
less-restrictive applications of the self-realization principle 
would necessarily be ad hoc, since it is extremely difficult to see 
how a court would be able to objectively assess the self-
realizing value of different types of speech. Therefore, even 
though it is highly unlikely that any judicial recognition of the 
self-realization value would give absolute primacy to the right 
of self-realization through expression,63 the inherently 
subjective nature of self-realization ensures that the merit of 
individual free speech claims will always remain subject to ad 
hoc comparisons of subjective intent against objective values. 
Additionally, any type of significant application of the self-
realization view would hinder the Court in its attempts to 
assign differential value to different types of speech, as well as 
require it to give less weight to the context in which the speech 
occurred, since a primary criterion for protection would be 
whether the speech contributed to individual self-realization. 
Even if the impairment were lessened by viewing self-
realization as a secondary or tertiary consideration in the 
analysis, it is nonetheless an impairment. Such impairments 
are at odds with some of the Court's most fundamental 
analytical approaches to the First Amendment, which are 
based on content and context rather than an individual's 
62. While t his reliance on subjective intent need not be complete- i.e. a court 
could attempt to assess the self.r ealizing value of speech objectively-it must be 
substantial. To say tha t there is an objective standard available to assess the self-
realizing potent ial from any particular act of expression is to essentia lly render the 
self-realization concept meaningless. 
63. To hold otherwise would be inconsis tent with the repea ted recogni tion of the 
court!:> that the First Amendment does not provide absolute protection for speech. 
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subjective view of the value of the speech.64 
B. The Instrumental View 
In contrast to the self-realization view, the instrumental 
view of the First Amendment would extend constitutional 
protection to expression only when necessary to further the end 
of democratic self-government.65 The nature of the 
instrumental view of constitutional rights generally was well 
described by Professor Bark in 1971: 
Secondary or derivative rights are not possessed by the 
individual because the Constitution has made a value choice 
about individuals. Neither are they possessed because the 
Supreme Court thinks them fundamental to all humans. 
Rather, these rights are located in the individual for the sake 
of a governmental process that the Constitution outlines and 
that the Court should preserve. They are given to the 
individual because his enjoyment of them will lead him to 
defend them in court and thereby preserve the governmental 
process from legislative or executive deformation.66 
There are two primary advantages of the instrumental 
approach to the First Amendment, when compared with the 
self-realization view. First, it is the view most consistent with 
the original understanding of the First Amendment, as well as 
the structure of American government.67 Second, it provides a 
role for the courts in interpreting the First Amendment value 
of speech, rather than surrendering that to the individual 
based on his own subjective views regarding the value of his 
64. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (extending the lesser "time, place, mannd' protective 
standard to commercial speech); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 
47;~ U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (application of the public forum doctrine, which accords 
~reater protection to speech occurring in a public forum). 
65. While the instrumental view potentially encompasses more ends than simply 
democratic self-government, I focus on a version of the instrumental view that views 
that as the only permissible end that First Amendment protection should further. 
Thus. my references to ·'the" instrumental view are actually a particular variant of the 
instrumental approach to the First Amendment-albeit the most widely accepted one. 
For ends that other proponents of the instrumental view generally, see infra note 77 
and accompanying text. 
66. Bork, supra note 55, at 17. 
67. See, e.g. . Valerie M. Fogelman & James Etienne Viator, The Critical 
Technologies Approach: Controlling Scientific Communication for the National 
Security, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 293, 347- 78 (1990) (setting out arguments regarding the 
original understanding of the First Amendment and adopting the self-government 
interpretation). 
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expression.68 Additionally, the instrumental view of the First 
Amendment not only ensures that speech that advances the 
process of democratic self-government can be allowed, it also 
allows (but does not require) speech that undermines 
democratic processes to be restricted. 
Admittedly, the instrumental view of the First Amendment 
articulated here leaves certain types of speech, that the vast 
majority of us find valuable, unprotected from the legislative 
majority.69 This certainly does not mean, however, that the 
instrumental view itself prohibits any type of speech; it simply 
places control over unprotected speech in the hands of the 
elected branches, allowing them to regulate as they see fit. In 
short, it does not propose to allow the courts to save the people 
from themselves, except in those cases where refusing to do so 
would foreclose, or meaningfully impinge on, the rights of 
democratic change for the minority. The structure of the 
Constitution and the nature of democratic government make 
clear that the First Amendment reaches this far. It is not clear 
that it reaches any further, and need not be extended to. 
C. Reasons for Adopting an Instrumental Approach to the First 
Amendment Focused on Democratic Self-Government 
The apparent bright-line nature of the instrumental view-
that judicial protection exists only for political speech- is one 
of its most attractive attributes. Some of the attraction 
evaporates under close scrutiny, however. Stating the 
proposition that only political speech is protectable through the 
courts only begins the judicial inquiry. The next question is: 
what constitutes political speech? This is, undoubtedly, a 
difficult inquiry. Polit ical speech could be defined very broadly, 
as Professor Meiklejohn suggests,70 or very narrowly, as 
68. Again, even though no viable self-realization approach to the First 
Amendment would protect speech solely based on the subjective contention of the 
speaker that it contributes to his personal self-fulfil lmen t, the self-realization approach 
grants what I view as an impermissible influence on the speaker's s ubjective beliefs. 
69. Depending on one's definition of "political speech."' See Fogelman & Viator, 
supra note 66, at 357 n . 414, for examples of how some commentators have defined 
political speech; things such as advertising and expressive behavior such as dancing or 
musicianship could potent ially be without protection. 
70. P1·ofessor Meiklejohn's basic thesis was that "the First Amendment ... fot·bids 
Congress to abridge the freedom of a citizen's speech, press. peaceable assembly, or 
petition, whenever those activities are utilized for the governing of the nation." 
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. C'r. REV. 245, 
256. He then went on to state that he viewed the freedom to vote, the freedom to 
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favored by Judge Bork,71 and it is not immediately clear 
whether one definition is more correct than the other. For 
example, a narrow definition of political speech may exclude 
folk songs, even though such a song may convey a particular 
political message as (or more) effectively as a speech given on 
the National Mall. On the other hand, a broad definition could 
provide protection for rather meaningless pop music or abstract 
art sculptures. 
Thus, the concept of political speech is potentially capacious 
indeed, leaving ample room for judicial discretion-presumably 
the very thing that the instrumental approach to the First 
Amendment is supposed to best prevent.72 Rather than 
discrediting the instrumental approach, however, perhaps all 
that this malleability means is that, in the case of the First 
Amendment, as in all other cases, it is impossible to eliminate 
judicial discretion. This reality, however, is not a reason to 
cease trying to cabin such discretion according to what "neutral 
principles"73 we can fairly see in the Constitution. For the 
reasons described above, I take the position that the First 
Amendment provides judicial protection only for political 
speech. 74 As discussed in the following subsection, the Supreme 
Court generally agrees with this view. I leave a comprehensive 
definition of political speech to other commentators 75 and find 
it sufficient, for the purposes of this article, to advance a theory 
of what the concept means in the context of public schools in 
Part IV below. 
educate and obtain education , the freedom to engage in the achievements of philosophy 
and the sciences, t he freedom to create and access literature and the arts, a nd the 
freedom to engage in public discussion of public issues ld. at 256-57. 
71. Bork defines political speech as "criticisms of public officials and policies, 
proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions, and 
speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country." Bork. supra 
note 55, at 29. Bork excludes, however, "speech advocating forcible overthrow of the 
government. or violation of law." !d. at 29- 30. 
72. The difference between the Meiklejohn definition (which includes almost 
everything) and the Bork definition (which is narrow indeed), shows the malleability of 
the term. 
73. See He1·bert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
74. I leave to other commentators the majority of the task of defining what 
political speech is, although 1 do, in Part IV. infra, discuss what I believe it is in the 
context of public school education. 
75. See, e.g., Fogelman & Viator. supra note 66, at 357-58 n. 414 (setting forth 
how leading commentators have defined political speech). 
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D. The Supreme Court's Position 
As between the instrumental and self-realization views of 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has come down in 
favor of the instrumental conception.16 While the Court has 
recognized, and given some weight to, the role of the First 
Amendment in an individual's ability to develop their faculties 
of retaining freedom of mind,77 the Court has declined to adopt 
the self-realization view as its guiding analytical approach in 
free speech cases. If the Court had adopted the self-realization 
model, one would not expect the Court to accord lesser or 
greater value to different types of speech.n Yet, that is 
precisely what the Court has done, by according commercial 
speech less value than political speech,79 while according no 
protection at all to other types of highly expressive and 
arguably self-actualizing speech (e.g. obscenity).80 Indeed, even 
the Court's approach to artistic expression- perhaps the place 
where it would be most likely to adopt a self-realization 
approach to speech-has been focused primarily on the effec t of 
the expression on the audience rather than its expressive value 
to the speaker.81 
76. See 0. Lee Reed, A Free Speech Metavalue for the Next Millenium: Autonomy 
of Consciousness in First Amendment Theory and Practice, 35 AJ\1. Bus. L.J. 1, 8-9 
(1997) ("The value of speech as an individual right has not been emphasized in 
constitutional case law although, ironically, t he Lockean view of 'unalienable" natural 
rights was considered 'self evident' in the Declaration of Independence.") (citations 
omltted). 
77. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis. J ., 
concurring) ("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State 
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an 
end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of ha ppiness and courage to 
be the secret ofliberty."), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
78. Fogdman & Viator, snpra note 66, at 364 ("[S]elf-realization theories cannot 
be reconciled with modern first amendment jurisprudence, which treats speech not 
equally but hierarch ically"). 
79. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. , 
425 lJ.S. 748, 771 (1976) (extending t he lesser "time, place, manner·· protective 
standard to commercial speech). 
80. Miller v . California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (noting that obscen ity is 
unprotected by the First Amendment). 
81. See Anne Salzman Kurzweg, Live A rt and the A1tdience: Toward a Speaker· 
Focused Freedom of Expression, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 441- 42 (1999) 
("Although members of the Supreme Court have perceived that the Constitution 
recognizes the intangible value of speech to the individual, the Court's approach 
toward freedom of expression has been dominated by audience-oriented terminology 
and justifications ... . Under these standards, artistic expression will be evaluated 
based on its social value, as embodied in the perceived substance of its contribu tion to 
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Although it has generally favored an instrumental 
approach to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has not 
come down as clearly in favor of the particular version of the 
instrumental view that I have set out here-the self-
government variant. The Court has viewed the purpose of the 
First Amendment more broadly than just the enabling of 
effective democratic government.82 There is no doubt, however, 
that a primary concern of the Court in the First Amendment 
context is with political speech and self-government. For 
example, in West Virginia v. Barnett, 83 the Supreme Court set 
out its view of the purpose underlying the First Amendment. 
Citing the Spanish Inquisition and the Russian practice of 
exiling dissidents to Siberia as examples of t he fruits of 
attempts at forced unity, the Court stated that "[t]hose who 
begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves 
exterminating dissenters. . . . It seems trite but necessary to 
say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was 
designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings."84 
Many other Supreme Court decisions confirm this view.85 
Thus, even though the Court has not yet adopted the 
specific conception of the First Amendment advocated for in 
this article, both sound principles of constitutional 
interpretation and the Court's prior First Amendment 
decisions support at least these propositions: (1) in the United 
States, free speech rights are not absolute, but context-
dependent; (2) a core purpose of the First Amendment is to 
enable effective democratic self-government;86 and (3) self-
realization through expression is not a core principle of the 
the public debate."). 
82. The best example is the Court's repeated references to the "truth·seeking" 
function served by the First Amendment through an open marketplace of ideas. While 
the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech protection certainly encompasses 
political speech, the Court has viewed it more broadly than that. 
83. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
84. !d. at 641 . 
85. See, e.g., Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, (1995); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,422 (1992) (Stevens, J ., concurring); Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191. 222 (1992) (Stevens, J . dissenting); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990) (Scalia, J. , dissenting); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 
414, 420 (1988); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 255 
(1986). 
86. See, e.g., EU v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 
222-23 (1989) (noting that speech facilitating self·government is at the "core . . . of the 
First Amendment freedoms."); accord supra. notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
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First Amendment.87 Accordingly, if it is to be consistent with 
the Court's broader First Amendment jurisprudence, any 
approach to student speech in public schools should focus 
primarily on the context and core values served by the First 
Amendment. I argue that the primary value that the First 
Amendment is directed at is the furtherance of constitutional 
democracy. 
The adoption of the instrumental approach to the First 
Amendment has implications for student speech in public 
schools. Unless there is no meaningful difference between the 
public school and adult educational context, the free speech 
rights of public school students are likely to be different than 
those for adults. Additionally, the free speech context of 
student rights should be examined with a view to how that 
educational setting furthers the democratic purposes that are 
at the acknowledged core of the First Amendment. The 
following section addresses the role of educational institutions 
in preparing citizens for democratic government. 
IV. THE NATURE OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING IT 
Applying the instrumental approach to the First 
Amendment question of student speech in public schools would 
allow school authorities to regulate student speech so long as 
the regulations did not frustrate the school's educational role in 
sustaining self-government. This immediately begs the 
following question: what is the role of the public schools in 
sustaining democratic government? In this section, I argue that 
the educational mission of the public schools, at least as far as 
is relevant to First Amendment analysis, is to prepare students 
to be good citizens in democratic society. I refer to this type of 
education, as have others who have done research in this field, 
as "democratic education." 
In this section, I draw heavily on the work of Professor Amy 
Gutmann. Before proceeding, it is important to note that 
Gutmann's work on democratic education is just as much about 
allocating decisions regarding who should educate and who 
should be educated as it is about what the content of that 
87. See supra notes 77- 80 and accompanying text. 
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education should be.88 Although I disagree with Gutmann in a 
number of respects,- probably, ironically, including the extent 
of the free speech r ights of public school students89-
nevertheless, I view her concept ion of democratic education as 
a useful tool for evaluating the context in which First 
Amendment doctrines are applied. At the risk of stating the 
obvious, my use of Gutmann's conception of democratic 
education neither implies that I accept her arguments 
regarding control of the primary educational system nor 
attempts to represent her views on how the principle of 
democratic education should influence the Supreme Court's 
analysis of First Amendment claims by public school students. 
With this caveat out of the way, this section focuses both on 
what democratic education is, as well as the roles that public 
schools play in its processes. It also differentiates the 
democratic educational role of the public schools from the role 
played by institutions of higher learning in democratic 
education. 
A. What is Democratic Education? 
Broadly speaking, democratic education is the teaching, 
both in curricular and noncurricular ways, of the essential 
values underlying constitutional democracy. 90 Early in 
America's history, the importance of education to effective 
government was recognized by Thomas Jefferson, who believed 
that basic education was required to sustain self-government. 
According to Jefferson, "[i]f a nation expects to be ignorant and 
free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and 
what never will be."91 He believed that citizens needed to be 
educated in order to exercise their democratic rights in ways 
88. Gutmann, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that her theory of democratic 
education is meant to provide ways of resolving both the problem of "who should have 
authority to make decisions about education, and . . . what the moral boundaries of 
that authority are."). 
89. See Amy Gutmann, What is the Value of Free Speech for Students, 29 ARIZ. S'l'. 
L.J. 519 (1997). 
90. J a mes L. Mursell defines "democratic education" as "education that is 
expressly planned and conducted to s upport, perpetuate, enlarge, and strengthen the 
democratic way of life . . . ." JAMES L. MURSELL, PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC 
EuuCATION 4 (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.) (1955). 
91. Michael Boucai, Note, CauJ{ht in a Web of Ignoran.ces: How Blach Americans 
are Denied the Equal Protection of the Laws, 18 NA1"L BLACK L.J. 239, 282 (2004) 
(quoting Letter from Thomas J efferson to Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816) (emphasis 
added)). 
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that preserve liberty and hedge against government 
corruption.92 Jefferson even set out the content of the 
Jeffersonian version of democratic education, albeit in a 
general way: education that "enable[s] every man to judge for 
himself what will secure or endanger his freedom."93 Other 
early prominent Americans took similar positions. 94 
Two of the most significant advocates of public education in 
America-Horace Mann and John Dewey-focused on the 
relationship between democracy and education. Dewey was 
particularly influential, and believed that "education must 
operate in view of a deliberately preferred social order."95 In 
other words, he viewed the primary responsibility of public 
schools as teaching students the citizenship skills that would 
enable them to be effective participants in a democratic 
republic. Horace Mann also viewed democratic education as 
absolutely essential to the maintenance of democratic society: 
However elevated the moral character of a constituency may 
be, however well informed in matters of general science or 
history, yet they must ... understand something of the true 
nature and functions of the government under which they 
live. That any one who is to participate in the government of a 
country, when he becomes a man, should receive no 
instruction respecting the nature and functions of the 
government he is afterwards to administer, is a political 
solecism.96 
Mann advocated for the public schools taking a key role in 
democratic education: 
In regard to the extent of the education to be provided for all, 
at the public expense, ... under a republican government, it 
seems clear that the minimum of this education can never be 
92. Molly O'Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the "Deregulated'' 
Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. Rr-:v. 137, 141 (2000) (citation omitted). 
93. Waite•· Karp, Why Johnny Can't Think: 1'lw Politics of Bad Schoolittg. 
HAIH'ER'S, June 1985, at 70 (quoting Lette•· from Thomas J efferson to John Tyler (rvlay 
26, 1810). 
94. See Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free 
Speech Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 769, 774- 77 (1995) (setting out views of prominent Americans regarding 
democratic education). 
95. John A. Dewey, The Underlying Philosophy of Education, in THE 
EDUCATIONAL FRON'I'Ho:H 287, 291 (William H. Kilpatrick ed. , 193B). 
96. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Plctralism, and its 
Effects on Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1178 (2003) (citation 
omitted). 
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less than such as is sufficient to qualify each citizen for the 
civil and social duties he will be called to discharge; such an 
education ... as is indispensable for the civil functions of a 
witness or a juror, as is necessary for the voter in municipal 
affairs; and finally, for the faithful and conscientious 
discharge of all those duties which devolve upon the inheritor 
of a portion of the sovereignty of this great republic.97 
25 
He viewed America's public school system as the place 
where basic r epublican principles that "form[ed] the common 
basis of our political faith" could be taught to all students 
without the extremism and distortion of party politics.98 
Democratic education is education that is aimed at the 
reproduction and improvement of democratic society and the 
preservation of democratic government.99 Professor Gutmann 
has stated that "[b]ecause being a democratic citizen entails 
ruling, the ideal of democratic education is being ruled, then 
ruling."100 In other words, democratic education is education 
designed to instill in its students, through an educational 
structure, the primary dualistic value of constitutional 
democracy: the concurrent submission to, and exercise of, 
authority. 101 
Although J efferson's "democratic" education was probably 
aimed at the reproduction of his own version of what America 
should be, the basic principle underlying his advocacy of 
democratic education is accepted by many: the need for a 
democratic society to instill in its citizens democratic values 
and the basic skills necessary to exercise them.102 
97. J ulie Und~rwood, Choice. the American Common School, and Democracy, in 
DEVELOPING Dt:MOCHATIC CHARACTER IN THE YOUNG 174 (R. Sodet·, J.l. Goodlad, & 
T.J. McMa nnon, eds., 2001) (quoting Horace Mann). 
98. La wrence Arthur Cre min, The American Common School: A Histor ic 
Concept ion (1 951). 
99. Gut ma nn, supra note 14, at 45 (stating t hat the aim of democratic education 
is "conscious social reproduction") (emphasis omitted) . 
100. Zd. at 3. 
I 01. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 362- 63 (1981 ed.) ("The good citizen should 
know a nd ha ve the capacity both to rule and be rule, and this very thing is the virtue of 
a citizen."). Another commentator defined a liberal democratic education as "one 
committed to the development of those capacit ies that permit individuals to fra me, 
pursue, revise and protect t heir own conception of the good as interdependent members 
of a liberal democratic community." David Hogan, The Logic of Protection: Citizenship, 
Justice, ancl Political Community, in CITIZENSHII' EDUCATION AND THE MODERN STATF; 
52 (Kerry Kennedy, ed. , The F'armer Press) (1997). 
102. See Mursell , supra note 89, at 4; see also Gutmann, supra note 14, at 173 
(setting out t hat both values inculcation and de mocratic skills a re permissible goals of 
democrat ic educat ion). 
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The broad agreement on the general proposition, however, 
masks a substantial dispute over what are the essentia l 
principles of democratic government and what types of 
educational means are appropriate for teaching them. 103 One 
possible answer to the question, "what is the necessary 
content of a democratic education?" is that a democratic 
education must be value free in order to be consistent with 
the democratic ideals of freedom of conscience and choice. 
While there is no doubt that freedom of conscience and choice 
are both important (and even essential) values that should be 
protected in a meaningfully democratic society, a democratic 
education cannot promote these values by simply being value 
free. The fact that both teaching and learning are inherent in 
the process of education suggests that education necessarily 
involves value choices: "If we urge critical thinking, then we 
value rationality. If we support moral reasoning, then we 
value justice. If we advocate divergent thinking, then we 
value creativity. If we uphold free choice, then we value 
autonomy or freedom. If we encourage 'no-lose' conflict 
resolution, then we value equality." l04 
Thus, if education is to be education in any meaningful 
sense-meaning if it is to involve teaching and learning-it 
must necessarily involve value choices. The fa9ade of value-
neutral education does not save us here-nor would we want it 
to, as attempts by instructors to appear value-neutral could 
lead to the development of an impermissible subjectivism in 
children. 105 
The mere fact that value choices are involved, however, 
does not mean that any value or idea that is consistent with 
democratic principles should be taught as part of a democratic 
103. Gutmann, supra note 14, at 53- 70 (discussing the content of democratic 
education from amoral, liberal neutrality, conservative moralism, and parental choice 
perspectives). 
104. ld. at 55 (quoting Howard Kirschenbaum, Clarifying Values Clarification: 
Some Theoretical Issues, in MORAL EDUCATION . .. IT COMES WITH THE TERRITORY 122 
(David Purpel and Kevin Ryan eds., 1976)) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 41 
("Cultivating character is a legitimate-indeed, an inevitable- function of education.") 
(emphasis added). 
105. See Bitensky, supra note 93, at 778-79: 
First, it remains questionable whether it is even humanly possible to teach 
without at least unconsciously transmitting the values of the teacher or school. 
Second, values clarification and cognitive moral development may encourage in 
children a false subjectivism or relativism, giving rise to the logical inference that 
no one set of values can be right. Such a viewpoint presumably would allow the 
child to conclude that apartheid is as acceptable as racial equality and integration, 
or that fascism is an acceptable alternative to democracy. 
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education. In other words, the teaching of the majority view 
about which particular kind of democratic government is best 
may not be a democratic education even though its content is 
wholly consistent with democratic ideals. Indeed, if an 
education seeks to instill a value set beyond that which is 
necessary for the education of good democratic citizens, it 
becomes an undemocratic education; one that is inconsistent 
with the basic values underlying democracy. It is undemocratic 
in the sense that it becomes no more than an indoctrination of 
one specific set of values among other sets equally compatible 
with the essential principles of democratic government-an 
attempt by a certain group of individuals to force their 
conception of the good life on everyone else.106 This "single 
value" approach to democratic education is the opposite- and 
equally untenable-extreme to the value-free approach. 
What becomes clear, then, is that democratic education 
involves the teaching and inculcation of that specific and 
limited set of values that are essential for the preservation of 
effective self-government. 107 Obviously, the debate regarding 
what constitutes the essential principles of a democratic 
education is ongoing and extremely complex. 108 Even a brief 
summary is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes of 
this article, however, I do adopt a particular view of the content 
of democratic education espoused by Professor Amy Gutmann 
in her book Democratic Education. Gutmann contends that the 
content of a democratic education is the instilling of values and 
the teaching of moral reasoning that is designed to ensure that 
each student receiving a democratic education be enabled to 
participate in the collective r e-creation of the society of which 
they are a part. 109 Specifically, Gutmann believes that a 
democratic education should seek to teach: 
democratic virtue: the ability to deliberate, and hence to 
participate in conscious social reproduction . .. [A] democratic 
state defends a degree of professional authority over 
106. See Gutmann, supra note 14, at 44 (noting that democratic education involves 
the teaching of the "value of critical deliberation" which involves "educating children to 
deliberate critically among a range of good lives and good societies" compatible with 
democratic principles). 
107. ld. at 63. 
108. See, e.g., TEACHING DEMOCRACY BY BEING DEMOCRATIC (Theodore L. Becker 
& Richard A. Couto eds., Praeger Publishers) (1996); Blacker, supra note 18; Gutmann, 
supra note 14; Hogan, supra note 98. 
109. Gutmann, supra note 14, at 39. 
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education . . . to the extent necessary to provide childnm with 
the capacity to evaluate those ways of life most favored by 
parental and political authorities. 110 
Gutmann asserts that teaching of deliberation involves the 
inculcation in students of two values: nonrepression and 
nondiscrimination-each of which are necessary and the 
combination of which is sufficient for democratic education. 111 
Although the principle of nonrepression suggests limits on 
the authority of the majority to exercise control over other 
individuals, it does not mandate individual freedom from 
regulation by others. To so define it would essentially equate 
nonrepression with license. 112 The idea that a necessary 
condition of democracy is the right to do as one pleases is 
incompatible with the very process of democratic self-
government, which involves, through deliberation, both the 
submission to, and the exercise of, authority at the same time. 
Indeed, nonrepression viewed as a right to do as one pleases 
would be most consistent with anarchy, one of the states of 
affairs that constitutional democracy is meant to avoid. 11 3 
If nonrepression does not mean the right to do what one 
wants without societal restraint, what does it mean? In the 
context of democratic education, nonrepression is best viewed 
as: 
[p]revent[ing] the state, and any group within it, from using 
education to restrict rational deliberation of competing 
conceptions of the good life and the good society. 
Nonrepression is not a principle of negative freedom. It 
secures freedom from interference only to the extent that it 
forbids using education to restrict rational deliberation or 
consideration of different ways of life.114 
While the principle of nonrepression can be viewed as the 
deliberative value applied to ideas, the principle of 
110. ld. at 46 (e mphasis omitwd). 
111. ld. at 44-47. 
112. The American Heritage Dictiona ry defines "license" as "(l]ack of due restJ·aint; 
[e]xcessive Creedom." The American Heritage Dictionary, available at 
http://www.answers.com/license&r=67 (last visited: Jan. 10, 2009). 
113. The American Heritage Dictionary defines ·'anarchy" as "1. Absence of any 
form of political authority. 2. Political disorder and confusion. 3. Absence of any 
cohesive principle, such as a common standard or purpose ... The American Heritage 
Dictionary, available at http://www.answers.com/anarchy&r=67 (last visited: Jan. 10. 
2009). 
114. Gutmann, su.pra note 14, at 44 (emphasis added). 
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nondiscrimination derives from the application of the 
deliberative value to people. Thus, according to Gutmann, 
nondiscrimination is "the distributional complement to 
nonrepression." 115 In order to be effective in promoting 
conscious social preservation of democracy, and to be truly 
democratic, democratic education must involve all citizens of 
the particular democracy. 11 6 If not, democratic education does 
not serve the ends that it exists to serve: promoting the values 
of democratic self-government underlying constitutional 
democracy, since "[t]he effect of discrimination is often to 
repress, at least temporarily, the capacity and even the desire 
of these groups to participate in the processes that structure 
choice among the good lives." 11 7 Accordingly, "[a]pplied to those 
forms of education necessary to prepare children for future 
citizenship [i.e. democratic education] . . . , the 
nondiscrimination principle becomes a principle of 
nonexclusion." 118 
Once the two basic principles comprising democratic 
education are set out, the question immediately becomes how 
are these to be taught? A concomitant question is whether they 
can be effectively taught in the same way to children as to 
adults. The following section deals with this question by 
exammmg how the principles of nonrepression and 
nondiscrimination can be effectively taught to children and 
adults in the context of public schools and institutions of higher 
education. 
B. Differences in Context, Aim, and Method: The Different Roles 
of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning in 
Democratic Education 
Once one has accepted the basic premise of democratic 
education-that it is necessary and acceptable to teach 
students certain essential values in the interest of perpetuating 
and improving democratic self-government-the next question 
obviously becomes how that is to be accomplished. One might 
assume that democratic education would be most effective if it 
were democratic in means as well as in content; indeed, it 
115. !d. at 45. 
116. !d. 
117. I d. 
ll8. !d. 
30 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
would seem a reasonable assumption that the best way to teach 
basic democratic values would be by the most democratic 
means possible. 119 This assumption immediately encounters 
problems, however, since the most democratic means of 
education may not always be the most effective way of 
conveying a desired message. 120 A lack of effectiveness in 
teaching the underlying value itself might undercut the 
effectiveness of any learning of the value derived from the way 
the teaching is done. For example, a teacher who attempts to 
teach using methods that promote maximum freedom of 
conscience and choice among students may find that she has 
lost all control over the content of her course. Indeed, her very 
democracy in teaching could result in the students learning 
and internalizing rather anti-democratic principles, even 
though her intention was to do it in a democratic way.121 In any 
event, since democracy involves the concurrent exercise of and 
submission to political authority, even educational structures 
that are somewhat hierarchical are not necessarily anti-
democratic. 
Common sense suggests that concerns over the 
undermining nature of democratic teaching methods may be 
less valid when the students are adults and more relevant 
when the teacher's pupils are young students. Other things 
being equal, adults are more likely to show respect for the 
teacher and her basic aims even if she surrenders some control 
over the content and educational methods of the course to her 
students. Additionally, adults may be more likely to recognize 
the dissonance between a democratic message and anti-
119. See, e.g., TEACHING DEMOCRACY, supra note 107. Although this argument has 
been around for a long time, see EUGENE C. BROOKS, EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY 
(Lyman P. Powell ed., Rand McNally & Company) (1919), it is increasingly common in 
the context of social studies and citizenship education. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC SCHOOLS, 
LESSONS 1:-.l POWERFUL EDUCATION (M.W. Apple & J.A. Beane, eds., 2007). 
120. See Gutmann, supra note 14, at 91 (not ing that "[t]he disciplinary virtues-
the imparting of knowledge and instilling of emotion along with intellectual 
discipline-are also among the purposes of democratic education, and apparently they 
are not always most effectively taught by the most democratic methods, especially 
among those students least committed to learning."); see also Bitensky, supra note 93, 
at 777-94 (setting forth research that suggests children have a limited capacity to 
develop values simply through the process of moral reasoning, and that hierarchical 
pedagogical methods may be the optimum means of instilling foundational values). 
121. While the possibility of learning anti-democratic principles exists in this 
situation, the greater danger is the learning of anti-democratic attitudes and values, 
especially those related to respect and submission to authority, which are very much a 
part of the essential values of democracy. 
1] STUDENT SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 31 
democra tic methods. On the other hand, younger students, 
especially those in public school, are unlikely to show the same 
level of respect as well as be less likely to sense the 
inconsistency involved in using hierarchical teaching methods 
to teach democratic principles. Indeed, there is substantial 
research suggesting that, if simply left to their own amidst a 
sea of ideas and values, children lack the moral reasoning 
skills to choose a set of acceptable fundamental values. If the 
values inculcation process is to succeed, some significant level 
of hierarchical instruction is necessary. 122 
Ultimately, however, it is difficult to say at what point 
either authoritarianism or democracy in method becomes so 
excessive that it undermines the ultimate goal of democratic 
learning. 123 The best that can be said is that some combination 
of the two is required to obtain the most effective results. Given 
this reality, and the relative expertise of educator s in this 
matter, some deference should be accorded their pedagogical 
decisions regarding which particular teaching methods are 
most li kely to best fulfill the legitimate aims of a democratic 
education. 
The t iming of values inculcation is a lso of concern in 
democratic education. Part icularly important is the question 
regarding the ages at which democratic values and skills are 
most effectively taught and the question as to whether the 
concept of democrat ic education is conceptual1y and temporally 
severable. In other words, does it contain multiple components 
t hat are best taught at different times in a person's life'? One 
view on this question would accept the premises and 
conclusions contained in the following chain of reasoning: 
(1) democratic education is concerned solely with the 
inculcation of democratic values; 
(2) these values must be inculcated, if at all, when children 
are young; and 
(3) therefore the enterprise of democratic education must be 
undertaken solely by the public schools. 
This view shortchanges the purpose of democratic 
education, however. As discussed previously, the end of 
democratic education is not just the inculcation of basic 
122. See Gutmann, supra note 14, at 90-91; see also Bitensky, supra note 93, at 
777- 94 (discussing research regarding children's limited ability to learn through an 
open process of moral reasoning). 
123. Gutmann, supra note 14, at 91. 
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democratic values, but is ultimately the preparation of citizens 
to be effective and responsible civic participants.124 Though 
important, values inculcation is just one part of this larger 
goal. While it is probably true, as comment ators have noted, 
that democratic values must be inculcated, if at all, while a 
child is young, 125 this does not mean that democratic education 
ends when children leave the public schools. Instead, 
democratic education changes when adults enter insti tutions of 
higher learning. Instead of being focused on values inculcation, 
it is focused on the development of skills necessary for effective 
employment of those values within the democratic system. 
These skills include the ability to clearly formulate and express 
one's opinion, to listen and comprehend the opinion of others, 
and to defend one's opinion in the face of arguments against 
it. 126 In short, they encompass the ability to persuade and be 
persuaded. 
From the acceptance of the premise that public schools and 
institutions of higher learning play different roles in the 
democratic education process follows the conclusion that they 
are likely to have to use different methods to accomplish their 
purposes. The process of instilling values is very much different 
than the process of teaching skills. It is different both because 
values inculcation is accomplishable primarily among the 
young, and because values inculcation is probably not best 
fostered by an open democratic dialogue with students. Indeed, 
such an apparent lack of structure (from a child's view) could 
very well leave younger children confused and unable to 
discern between arguments over competing viewpoints and the 
fundamental principles that underlie the reason for employing 
a particular teaching method. 
In contrast, the development of the critical reasoning and 
persuasive skills necessary for effective participation in the 
democratic system is best accomplished in an open forum 
124. ld. at 173 ("Schooling does not stop serving democracy, however, when it 
ceases to he compulsory-or when all educable citizens reach the democratic threshold. 
Its purposes cha nge."). 
125. /d. at 173-74 n.4 (citing research regarding the reduced effectiveness of 
values inculcation at the higher education level). 
126.There is .. . a nother , equally complex and intellectually more challenging way in 
which students can be taught to understand the moral demands of democt·atic life. 
While not a substitute for character training, learning how to th ink carefully and 
critically about political problems, to articulate one's views and defend them before 
people with whom one disagrees is a form of moral education to which young adul ts a re 
more receptive and for which universities are well suited. !d. at 173. 
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where ideas, both controversial and not, can be expressed and 
examined through dialogue with others. Unlike the values 
inculcation that occurs in primary schools, democratic skill 
development is probably not effectively accomplished in a 
hierarchical situation in which students are expected to listen 
to and learn from an authority figure. 127 Among adults in a 
higher education context, a free-wheeling, open dialogue is 
likely to further democratic education while not hindering 
values inculcation. 128 The teaching and acceptance of these 
basic democratic values is likely to have been accomplished, if 
at all, at the primary education stage. Such principles have 
likely been deeply embedded, if they ever will be, in the 
students' character s by the time they enter institutions of 
higher learning.129 Additionally, essential values are less likely 
to be undermined in an open battle of arguments, given adult 
students' greater capacity to distinguish between mere 
argument and basic principles. IJO 
Recognition of the different democratic educational 
purposes served by public schools and universities is essential 
to assessing the validity of the educational methods that can be 
legitimately employed in aid of democratic education in each 
context. In public schools, where the democratic education 
concern is primarily with values inculcation, the goal of 
instilling a specific set of values- i.e. nonrepression and 
nondiscrimination-combined with the limited ability of 
students to discern between principle and argument likely 
requires a more hierarchical approach than would be 
necessary, or justified, if the interim goals and students were 
different, as they are in the higher education context.131 
Thus, even though such hierarchical methods would be 
127. Id. at 59 (noting that the nondemocratic type of paternalism necessary for 
valu~s inculcation is not justifiable in the a dult education context) . 
128. SC'e id. at 172- 93 (discussing the democratic purposes of higher education 
generally). 
129. See id. at 1 n (''Highet· education should not be necessary for inculcating basic 
democratic virtues, such as toleration. tru th telling, and a predisposition to nonviolence. 
I doubt whether it can be. If adolescents have not developed these character traits by 
the time they rl!ach college. it is probably too late for professors to inculcate them . . . 
. ''). 
1 :.10. S ee Bitensky. supra note 93, at 781- 94 (discussing the greater capacity of 
a dults to engage in the process of moral reasoning). 
131. Gut mann, su.pra note 14, at 59 (noting t hat "democratic paternalism toward 
childre n" does not "undermineD the possibility of a genuinely democratic society" in the 
same way that ·'nondemocratic paternalism towards adults" does). 
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incompatible with the purposes of democratic education in the 
higher education context, they may nonetheless be the most 
effective (and most democratic possible) methods for achieving 
the values inculcating purpose that public schools exist 
primarily to serve, and are therefore not inconsistent with 
basic democratic principles when used in that context. 
Understanding how these contexts and purposes establish the 
universe of acceptable teaching methods and missions is 
essential to understanding how the Supreme Court would 
interpret student First Amendment free speech rights in public 
schools when applying the educational mission standard that I 
advocate for here. 
Although I believe that common sense notions of the mental 
and emotional capabilities of children and adults, in addition to 
educational research , support the basic contention that the 
purposes of democratic education are unlikely to be 
accomplished through exclusively democratic means in public 
schools, I make no claim that one particular pedagogical 
method is always most effective in any one situation. Indeed, I 
believe that the differences in context, aim, and method evident 
between public schools and universities teach that the opposite 
is true. And it is the reality of these differences that justifies 
extending some level of deference regarding pedagogical 
methods to the educational experts themselves. The following 
section focuses on how I believe this deference as to choice 
between hierarchical and democratic methods can be reconciled 
with the First Amendment r ights of public school students. 
V. T HE D EMOCRATIC EDUCATION APPROACH TO STUDENT 
SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
As the previous paragraphs make clear, I disagree with the 
broad interpretation of Tinker, given its narrow focus on 
classroom discipline and disregard for what I view as the 
primary purpose behind the First Amendment. I also believe 
that the Court's decisions in Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse 
were correct and played important roles in implementing minor 
corrections in the Tinker standard. Ultimately, however, they 
did not go far enough. What was attractive about the broad 
interpretation of Tinker was its comprehensiveness. Upon its 
implicit abandonment by the Court, we are left with nothing 
resembling a comprehensive First Amendment approach to 
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public education. I argue that a democratic education approach 
can, and should, fill the gap. The Supreme Court's 
instrumental approach to the First Amendment combined with 
the role of the public schools in democratic education suggests 
how the Court should approach the question of student free 
speech rights in public schools: that students possess a 
judicially enforceable right to speak only when it is clear that 
repression of their speech could not reasonably serve the goals 
of democratic education. 
The approach derived from this principle would essentially 
create a presumption of constitutionality for school regulations 
of speech. Under this theory, courts would uphold a public 
school's regulation of studen t speech unless a student could 
show that the restriction of their speech could not reasonably 
serve one of the twin essential values of democratic education: 
nonrepression and nondiscrimination. Admittedly, this 
standard shifts the burden of proof from the school to the 
student, which is not an insignificant change. Nevertheless, the 
shift is an important one because it recognizes that school 
regulation of the educational environment itself serves 
important First Amendment and civic interests 132 by creating 
an environment in which democratic values inculcation can 
take place, and acknowledges the relative expertise of 
educators in choosing those educational methods best designed 
to achieve the educational goals of democratic education. 
Ultimately, my approach extends a limited degree of 
deference to educators regarding their chosen method of 
democratic education, while not according any deference to 
schools on the permissible content of democratic education. The 
limited deference accomplished by means of the presumption 
shift is only accorded to public school educators' decisions on 
how these values are best taught. The twin goals of 
nonrepression and nondiscrimination are absolute values. 
Expertise is no answer for a restriction that clearly contravenes 
either of these essential values. Such a restriction would be 
unconstitutional as nothing more than an educator's attempt to 
impose a non-fundamental value or idea upon a student. 
The democratic education standard for public school 
student speech also serves the self-government purpose of the 
First Amendment better than would the broad standard the 
132. For thoughtful commentary on this point , see Ha fen, supra note 18. 
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Supreme Court set out in Tinher because it acknowledges both 
the role of the student and the school in the promotion of First 
Amendment values. It considers the learning environment as a 
whole when applying the First Amendment, rather than 
focusing primarily on the student. This approach is more 
consistent with what I believe to be, and what the Supreme 
Court has generally held to be, 133 the correct view of the First 
Amendment: that it confers a collective, rather than an 
individual, right aimed at enabling democracy rather than 
enabling expression itself. Importantly, this standard also 
ensures that public school teachers are not required to 
surrender substantial control over classroom curriculum to 
their students. It would allow teachers to regulate speech that 
has no discernible value as far as democratic education is 
concerned, regardless of whether it constituted a physical 
disruption of the classroom environment. 
I turn next to two possible objections to the democr atic 
education approach to student speech in public schools. First, 
some may object that even the inculcation of the basic (and 
widely accepted) values of nonrepresswn and 
nondiscriminat ion essentially constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination, which the Supreme Court nearly always strikes 
down as violative of the First Amendment. 134 Although even 
the limited type of values inculcation that occurs in democratic 
education is viewpoint discrimination in the sense that these 
values are taught as superior to other alternative perspectives, 
it is not the type of viewpoint discriminat ion that the 
Constitution prohibits. Indeed, the entire purpose of the 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights is to place certain values-
and therefore viewpoints- beyond the control of the 
majority.135 I t is a charter of shared values-democratic 
values-that are non-negotiable absent the process of 
constitutional amendment. It would indeed be odd to hold tha t 
the First Amendment, the purpose of which is to enable the 
structure of democratic government set up by the Constitution, 
would forbid the inculcating of the values necessary to sustain 
133. See discussion in Part III.D, supra. 
134. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 ("The principle that has emerged 
from our cases is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech 
in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at t he expense of others.") (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
135. Furh man v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972). 
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the very government it exists to support. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the legitimacy of values inculcation in 
public schools in prior cases. 136 
Another potential objection with the democratic education 
approach to public school student free speech is that it is likely 
to restrict more student speech than the broad Tinker standard 
would. While this is probably true, it is not necessarily the 
case. Under the Tinker standard, disruption of the teaching 
environment is itself a sufficient justification for a school to 
prohibit expression. While it is certain that, in the vast 
majority of cases, a physical disruption of the learning 
environment is harmful to a school's efforts in democratic 
education, it is not inevitably so. In any event, even if this 
approach leads to a reduction in the amount of judicially 
protectable speech, it ensures both that the value of the speech 
that is protected and the value of the type of education 
facilitated are of the highest nature, rather than protecting any 
type of speech or facilitating any type of education in which a 
student or school chooses to engage. The democratic education 
standard for First Amendment protection requires schools to 
look at their practices in curtailing speech from a new 
perspective: one of fundamental values rather than merely 
classroom discipline. Therefore, even as it allows public school 
teachers to retain control of the education that occurs in their 
classrooms, it requires them to engage in the vital process of 
democratic education, which the broad Tinker standard does 
not. 
Finally, despite what are certain to be claims to the 
contrary, 137 it is significant that the democratic education 
approach to student speech in no way requires the censorship of 
any more speech than would the broad Tinker (or any other) 
standard. School districts, individual teachers, or 
administrators are always free to allow speech that they could, 
under the democratic education standard, constitutionally 
prohibit. As Justice Thomas noted in Morse, students, parents, 
or otherwise interested citizens who disagree with a particular 
136. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685- 86: Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270- 73. 
137. Those advancing such claims are likely to adopt the perspective of Lord Acton: 
that power corrupts and a bsolute power corrupts absolutely. Therefore, they would 
argue, even though there is no requirement of regulation, the practical effect of a lesser 
standard of judicial protection will be more regulation of student s peech . They are 
probably correct. I simply contest t he proposition that the Constitution grants the 
judiciary protective power here. 
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school board's, administrator's, or teacher's approach to free 
expression may always seek a change in the political or 
administrative leadership. There are means in place to allow 
them to do that. Additionally, parents remain free to choose to 
send their children to private and charter schools or to educate 
them at home if they remain concerned about the schools' 
approach to free speech. 138 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has struggled for nearly forty years in 
its attempt to balance the free speech rights of public school 
students against the necessity that the public schools be able to 
effectively educate. In this article, I have suggested an 
approach that I believe strikes the appropriate constitutional 
and policy balance in dealing with this difficult question. While 
much in need of further definition and refinement, the 
democratic education approach to the question of First 
Amendment rights public schools provides the right framework 
within which the Court should analyze the issue. 
138. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
